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1.
INTRODUCTION

The Federal Tort Claims Act, the effective date of which was
2 August 1946, contains, as one of the most essential provisions
thereof, the statement that the United States consents to liability
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.'
It would appear then, at the outset, that when an action is instituted under the terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the local
law will be applied to the same extent as an action in the State
Courts between two private parties. However, in actions brought
under the terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act the federal courts
apparently are independently applying federal law and are not applying strictly the injunction that the United States consents to
liability as if it were a private person. The following material indicates but a few of the fields and problems presented where this
trend seems to be apparent.
II.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The Federal Tort Claims Act originally provided for a one
year period of limitation from the time a claim accrued, or from
the effective date of the Act (2 August 1946), whichever was later.
This provision was amended in 1949 to provide for a two year period
of limitation. When considered with the injunction contained in the
Act that the United States consents to liability under circumstances
in which a private party would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place, the statutory provision for limitation of actions has caused the courts some difficulty.
Periods of limitation have been described by the writers as
either substantive or remedial in character. Should local periods of
limitation be described as remedial, it would seem that an action
based on the Federal Tort Claims Act would be governed by the
limitation of the Act. However, if a state statute or period of limitation is classified as substantive-affecting the right not the remedy
-it would seem that under the terms of the Federal Tort Claims
Act local law should govern at least in cases where the period of
i Tit.
28, Sec. 1346; USCA.
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limitation does not exceed that prescribed in the federal law.
This approach has not been adopted by federal courts which
have faced the problem. Shortly after the passage of the Federal
Tort Claims Act the question was presented in a series of cases involving local wrongful death legislation. In Burkhardt v. United
States, 165 F 2d 869, an action was brouaht for the benefit of the
widow of Burkhardt who was killed on 2 September 1945. The action
was instituted on 5 December 1946 in the United States District
Court. It was dismissed because it was not instituted within the one
year required by the Maryland Wrongful Death Act. On Appeal the
plaintiff contended that the decision of the lower court was erroneous because the action was instituted within one year after the
effective date of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Under the law of Maryland, the one year statutory period of
limitation had been described as a condition precedent to the institution of an action. The Court of Appeals reasoned that it was enjoined to look to state law for the definition of the wrong and the
extent of liability, but that it is to look to the Act itself for the limitations of time. To Judge Parker it made no difference that the
local limitation was held by the state courts to be a condition on
the exercise of the right rather than a limitation on the remedy.
"This holding is based upon the narrow ground that this limitation
is imposed by statute creating the cause of action and is, to say the
best of it, technical and legalistic reasoning, which is not followed
in all states."
The rationale of the Burkhardt case was extended in Young v.
United States, 184 F 2d 587. In this case an action was filed for a
death which occurred in the District of Columbia. The local wrongful death act provided for a one year period of limitation. The deceased suffered an injury on 25 March 1948, died on 4 April 1948,
and the action was filed on 9 May 1949, more than a year after the
death. The action, then, ordinarily would have been barred not only
under local law, but also by the period of limitation contained in
the Federal Tort Claims Act. However, on 25 April 1949, the Act
was reenacted and partially amended. Included in the amendments
was the present period of limitations:
"A tort claim against the United States shall be forever
barred unless action is begun thereon within two years after
such claim accrues or within one year after the date of
the enactment of this amendatory sentence, whichever is
later. .

....

The government argued as it did in the Burkhardt case that
because a right of action for wrongful death was not authorized at
common law and is of statutory origin, the right does not survive
the period of limitation contained in the statute which creates it.
A majority of the Court, accepting the argument that the period of
limitation was substantive, reasoned that the Federal Tort Claims
Act extended the right which originally was created by the local
statute. Where it provides for a longer period than is granted in
the local legislation, the Federal Tort Claims Act controls as it does
where the local period is longer than that contained in the Act.
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The dissenting opinion fundamentally disagreed with the majority,
stating that since the Federal Tort Claims Act amounts to nothing
more than a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit; the two year
limitation was but a maximum time in which suits could be brought
against the government, and did not foreclose shorter local periods
of limitation which are construed to be substantive.
The majority opinion was followed and restricted in Moran v.
United States, 102 F. Supp. 275. In this case the Court refused to
apply -the Burkhardt decision and said that the Young case was
applicable in those situations where Congress had created the law
defining the substantive rights and therefore could extend the
rights so created.
In another decision, United States v. Westfall, 197 F. 2d 765,
an injury occurred in the State of Washington on 20 February 1946,
and the action was commenced 21 April 1950 (within one year after
the Federal Tort Claims Act was amended). It was contended that
since the action was created by and brought under the terms of
the Washington Statute, the local three year statute applied. It
was held, however, that inasmuch as the action was brought within
the period prescribed by the 1949 Amendment to the Federal Tort
Claims Act, it was not barred by any local period of limitation.
Accordingly, the reasoning of the Moran case was not followed
and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals applied the federal period of
limitation independently of whether or not the substance of action
was created by federal or state law.
There appears to be no doubt that where the local period of
limitation is construed to be remedial in nature, or where the local
period, regardless of its character, is longer than that contained in
the Federal Tort Claims Act, the latter will govern.
If the Federal Tort Claims Act is assumed to be substantive
in nature, apparently the theory of the Young case, applying the
longer period of the Act and foreclosing shorter substantive provisions contained in local legislation, is logically supported. However,
if the position of the dissent in the Young case is adopted, the
United States should not be held liable since the Act amounts only
to a waiver of immunity, and the courts are enjoined to apply local
substantive law which does not conflict with the provisions of the
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enabling federal legislation; the United States does not assume
liability any greater than that of a private party under similar
circumstances. It has been said that the legislative history supports
both positions, but that practical considerations perhaps would
support the majority position. By providing a longer period in
which to commence actions, fewer private relief bills will be introduced to Congress.
The federal courts seem to be following the Burkhardt-Young
line of decisions. In the case of Foote v. Public Housing Commissioner of The United States, 107 F. Supp. 270, the court emphasized
that in an action against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the time within which the suit may be commenced
should be determined by the provisions of the Act and not the
state statute of limitation.
This case presented a relatively new facet of the problem. The
Act provides that a claim must be submitted within two years from
the time it accrues. The problem facing the court in the Foote
case was a construction of the word "accrues." The plaintiffs occupied a dwelling unit in a public housing project for veterans at
Cadillac, Michigan, which project was developed by the public
housing authority and the city of Cadillac. On 14 February 1949,
a coal stove in this unit exploded, resulting in the death of plaintiffs'
two children on the following day.
On 21 July 1950, the probate court for Wexford County, Michi-
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gan, appointed the plaintiff-father administrator of the estate of
his deceased children, and on 27 July 1951, an order was entered
authorizing him to institute a suit against the government. On 17
October 1951, more than two years after the death of the children,
a complaint was filed alleging that the death was due to the negligence of the agents of the government. The defendant moved to
dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the period
of limitation contained in the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Plaintiff contended that under the law of Michigan a claim
or cause of action for wrongful death, which is a new cause of
action in the personal representative of the decedent, does not
accrue until the administrator is appointed. The court ruled that
the claim "accrued" upon the death of the children. It decided this
question as a matter of federal law, the state law to the contrary
notwithstanding. In support of its conclusion, it relied heavily on
the case of Reading Company v. Koons, Administrator,271 US 58, in
which the Supreme Court construed similar language contained in
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. It also relied on Piascik v.
United States, 65 F. Supp. 430, which construed the language contained in the Suits in Admiralty Act.
It is submitted that these cases easily are distinguishable. The
Federal Employers' Liability Act deals with death or personal injury due to negligence of the employer or his agents. However, nowhere in this Act is there any injunction to apply the law of the
situs as is found in the Federal Tort Claims Act. In the Piascik case
the court construed language on the Suits in Admiralty Act, and itself relied on the decision in the Koons case. Because there was no
requirement to follow local law, construction of the word "accrues"
was properly decided as a matter of federal law. However, state
decisions construing such language in state legislation involves
an interpretation of local substantive law-an essential phase of
the locally created cause of action, and under the Provisions of
the Federal Tort Claims Act, such interpretations should be followed. It is submitted that the decision in Foote v. Public Housing
Commissioner of the United States goes a long way from the injunction to follow local law.
The conclusion in the Foote case was underscored in Bizer v.
United States, 124 F. Supp. 949 (N. D. Calif.). In this case the
defendant moved for a summary judgment on the basis that the
two year period of limitations had run in a malpractice suit brought
under the terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The problem
again, as emphasized by the court, was the conflict between the
injunction to apply local law and the period of limitations contained
in the Act. Under California law, the Statute of Limitations does
not commence until the patient knows, or should know, the cause
of his disability or until the doctor-patient, or hospital-patient relationship is severed. Under local law the statute had not run because
of the definition of the accrual of the action. It was held, however,
that the question of when the period has run is a matter of Federal
law and not state law even though the latter determines the existence of the cause of action. Since under the Foote case, the action
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"accrues" at the date of the injury, the action was barred. "If
Section 2401 (b) is a real period of limitation as distinguished from
a yard stick of time, it must prescribe this beginning."
Accordingly, with regard to the period of limitations to be
applied, that which is set forth in the Act will apply even though
the state law is interpreted by local courts to be substantive,
whether shorter or longer than the period contained in the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Further, even though the local substantive law
defines and creates the cause of action, and as a part thereof the
time when it accrues, the federal courts will independently apply
"federal law" to determine the time of accrual of the action. Such
an approach is difficult to follow in the light of the injunction
contained in the Act itself and in light of the apparently erroneous
but commonly accepted notion that there is no independent body
of federal common law.
III.
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT AND LOCAL LAW

Title 28, Sec. 1346, USCA, provides in essence that the United
States consents to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
acts of its employees acting within the scope of their office or
employment under circumstances where a private person would
be liable to the claimant according to the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred. This principle, apparently easy to
apply, has given the federal courts some trouble in at least two
situations:
(1) The military personnel and their relationship to the
Government.
(2) Local legislation of the "Permissive Use" variety.
The first situation has provided a source of controversy because
of the fact that the soldier-government relationship is an oddity
so far as state law is concerned. There would appear to be no question that if a member of the armed forces is engaged in activity
which has a counterpart in civilian life, the question of whether
the act or omission occurred within the scope of the employment
of the soldier, could be answered by the application of local law.
However, a member of the armed forces not only is an employee
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as commonly defined, but he also assumes a 24 hour status relationship to the Federal Government, the counterpart of which is
lacking in civilian life. It is in this latter field that the federal
courts have had great difficulty in applying local law.
In the case of U. S. vs. Campbell, 172 Fed. 2d 500, a claim was
based upon evidence that while the plaintiff was standing on the
sidewalk near a railroad station, she was negligently and wrongfully collided with and knocked down by a sailor who "in line
of duty" was running to board the troop train. Obviously there
was no local law which dealt with "line of duty" and its impact on
the doctrine of respondeat superior. The concept of "line of duty"
is one which has particular reference only to governmental agencies
and their relationships to their own employees. It was held in the
Campbell case that the Government would not be liable because
of the "line of duty" concept, but only if the member of the armed
forces was acting within the scope of his employment such that
a private party would be held liable under like circumstances.
In Feres vs. U. S., 340 U. S. 135, an action was brought because
of the death of a soldier during a barracks fire due to negligence.
The Supreme Court held that the question of the relationship of
military personnel to the Government is one strictly of federal law
and that traditionally one in such a status has no claim against his
superior because of negligence.
Such a notion of the application of independent federal law
was applied in the case of the United States vs. Sharpe, 189 Fed.
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2d 239 (4th Cir.) where an action was brought to recover for injuries
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. A whole company was ordered
to move from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to Elgin Field, Florida.
A few members of the company who owned private automobiles
were given permission to drive the same independently of the
convoy consisting of the remainder of the company. No specific
orders were issued to the private car owners other than the date
to report to destination. During the course of the journey, one of
the select few was involved in an accident due to his negligence
and thereafter an action was instituted against the government. It
was held:
"Attempt is made to distinguish the Eleazer case on the
ground that the collision occurred there in North Carolina
and was governed by North Carolina law. The question at
issue, however, is whether Sgt. Thompson was 'acting
within the scope of his office or employment' within the
meaning of the statute in operating his automobile; and
this involves the question of statutory construction to which
the federal courts are not bound by local decision but apply
their standards *** We look to the federal law and decisions to determine whether or not the person who inflicted
the injury was 'an employee of the government acting
within the scope of his office or employment'. We look to
local law for the purpose of determining whether the act
with which he is charged gives rise to liability. The Tort
Claims Act adopts the local law for the purpose of defining
the tort liability, and not for the purpose of determining the
relationship of the government to its employees."
This group of cases would seem to indicate that if the activity
of the Government employee is such that there is a counterpart in
civilian life, so that there are precedents to be found, the federal
courts will apply local law to determine liability. However, where
no such counterpart exists, the liability of the United States will
be decided on the basis of federal law. Such a conclusion would
appear to be consistent with the intent of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, because the Government apparently did not intend to subject
itself to liability any greater than that of a private party under
similar circumstances; if a private party could not be liable under
such circumstances, there is no reason to suppose that the United
States has consented to any other greater liability.
Another problem which has arisen under the Act is that of
whether the Government consented to liability in all situations
where a private party would be liable under local law. This is
not the same problem as whether it will be liable in situations
where a private party would not be liable, and should not be confused with the problem of being "non-civilian" activity discussed
above. This problem arises out of situations where a private party
ordinarily would be held liable under local law; the specific ques-
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tion is whether or not the United States will also be held liable in
the same fashion as a private party. The area of consideration
involves recent legislation found in a number of states which is
termed "Permissive Use" legislation.
The federal courts first faced such legislation in the State of
California. In the case of Long vs. United States, 78 Fed. Supp. 35,
an action was instituted by the plaintiff under the Federal Tort
Claims Act because of personal injuries sustained in an automobile
accident. One of the causes of action contained allegations that
a civilian employee of the army was operating a government vehicle
"with the permission and consent of the defendant". The Court
concluded under California precedent, that the employee was not
acting within the scope of his employment but was on a frolic and
detour resulting in a material deviation. However, under the California "Permissive Use Law," regardless of the scope of employment, the negligence of the employee was imputable to the
employer:
"Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible
for the death of, or injury to person or property resulting
from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle, in
the business of such owner, or otherwise, by any person
using or operating the same with the permission, express
or implied, of such owner, and the negligence of such person
shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes of civil
damages." (Sec. 402, California Vehicle Code)
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The court, however, refused to apply the "Permissive Use
Statute" because it held:
"Thus the lex loci delicti is in effect incorporated into the
Act, enabling the Federal Courts to refer to the common
law and statutes of the state or territory where the act or
omission occurred in order to determine (1) what act or
omission of an employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, is negligent
or wrongful."
However, where a private party will be held liable even for
acts not based upon notions of respondeat superior, local law will
not. be applied; the Government has only consented to liability
where the employee was acting within the scope of his office or
employment. Liability imposed to any greater extent than this
is beyond the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity, and accordingly the federal courts cannot and will not apply the local law.
A case arising out of Minnesota provides an interesting comparison to the Long case. In Clemens vs. United States, 88 Fed.
Supp. 971, the Court was faced with the Minnesota statute which
provides that where a vehicle is operated
"by a person other than the owner, with the consent of
the owner, express or implied, the operator thereof shall
*** be deemed to be the agent of the owner of such motor
vehicle ***".

The Court ruled that although the statute broadens the field
of respondeat superior, it only established the agency by prima
facie evidence which could be rebutted by the defendant. Since
the evidence was to the contrary and rebutted the presumption,
no agency was established and the United States was held not liable.
Apparently, where liability is imputed as a matter of law,
local law, as in the Long case, will not be applied. But where the
statute is only evidentiary in character, although "broadening" the
scope of respondeat superior, it will be applied by the federal courts.

Iv
CONCLUSION

Although it is commonly stated that an action brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act will be governed by the law of the
situs, there are situations where local law will not be followed by
the federal courts. A few of these have been discussed above,
including such questions as the Statute of Limitations, the strictly
military activity, and local law which extends the common law
notions of respondeat superior. These exceptions to the application
of the law of the situs are growing, and it is believed that practicing lawyers who file an action against the Government f6r
negligence, should be apprised and aware of them. In any event,
it certainly is not true that under and by virtue of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, the United States is now liable under the local
law where a private party would also be liable under like circumstances.
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